In Re: First Merch. Accept. Corp. v. JC Bradford & Co. by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-14-1999 
In Re: First Merch. Accept. Corp. v. JC Bradford & Co. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: First Merch. Accept. Corp. v. JC Bradford & Co." (1999). 1999 Decisions. 322. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/322 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed December 14, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-5377 
 
IN RE: FIRST MERCHANTS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, 
       Debtor 
 
v. 
 
J. C. BRADFORD & CO., 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 97-cv-01500) 
District Judge: Hon. Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. 
 
Argued July 26, 1999 
 
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD and McKEE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 14, 1999) 
 
       Lawrence R. Ahern, III (Argued) 
       Gullett, Sanford, Robinson & Martin 
       Nashville, TN 37219-888 
 
        Attorney for Appellant 
 
       Laura Davis Jones 
       James P. Hughes, Jr. 
       Brendan L. Shannon (Argued) 
       Christian Douglas Wright 
       Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor 
       Wilmington, DE 19899-0391 
 
        Attorneys for In Re: First 
        Merchants Acceptance Corp. 
 
 
  
       P. Matthew Sutco (Argued) 
       Martha L. Davis 
       United States Department of Justice 
       Washington, D.C. 20530 
 
       Patricia A. Staiano 
       John D. McLaughlin, Jr. 
       Frederic J. Baker 
       Daniel K. Astin 
       United States Department of Justice 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
        Attorneys for United States 
        Trustee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal raises a statutory interpretation question of 
first impression in this court and, as far as can be 
ascertained, in any of the courts of appeals. At issue is 
whether the 1994 amendment to S 503 of the Bankruptcy 
Code which added the authorization for reimbursement of 
expenses to a member of a creditors committee thereby also 
authorized reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred by 
such a member. The Bankruptcy Court1 ruled that the 
Code prohibits any reimbursement of professional fees 
incurred by committee members. The creditor appeals. 
 
I. 
 
First Merchants Acceptance Corp. ("FMAC" or"the 
Debtor"), a company that purchases used-car loans from 
auto dealers, filed a petition for reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 11, 1997. 
Appellant J.C. Bradford & Co. ("Bradford"), which holds a 
number of FMAC promissory notes, is a general unsecured 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court sat as the Bankruptcy Court. Because the rulings 
at issue are in the province of a Bankruptcy Court in the first instance, 
we will refer to the court in that capacity. 
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creditor of FMAC. Bradford states that the assets and 
liabilities of FMAC were each over $100 million and that 
there were between 200 and 299 creditors. 
 
Shortly after the petition was filed the United States 
Trustee formed an eight-member committee of unsecured 
creditors ("the committee"). Bradford, being a holder of one 
of the largest claims against the Debtor, was appointed to 
the committee and served as its chairman. 
 
Pursuant to S 1103(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
permits the committee to employ attorneys and other 
professionals with the approval of court, the committee filed 
two successive applications with the Bankruptcy Court to 
retain the services of two firms as legal counsel. The 
Bankruptcy Court in successive orders granted the 
applications to employ the law firm of Pepper, Hamilton & 
Scheetz LLP (now Pepper Hamilton LLP) and Faegre & 
Bensen LLP as counsel. 
 
Bradford retained the law firm of Bass, Berry & Sims, 
PLC ("Bass"), as its own counsel in the course of the 
bankruptcy. Bass had apparently represented Bradford 
with respect to the notes before the bankruptcy. According 
to Bradford, Bass was retained by Bradford to assist it both 
in its capacity as a creditor and as a member and chair of 
the committee. Bradford also contends that some services 
Bass performed were with the knowledge of, and at the 
request of, the committee's counsel and members of the 
committee. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court approved a Chapter 11 plan for 
FMAC on March 16, 1998. Shortly thereafter, Bradford 
applied for reimbursement, as an administrative expense, of 
some of the attorney's fees it paid to Bass that it incurred 
as a member and the chairman of the committee. 
Applications for reimbursement for legal services and 
financial services were also filed by the Debtor and by the 
committee as a whole. The Bankruptcy Court approved the 
applications filed by the Debtor and the committee, but 
denied Bradford's application. In so doing, the court 
reasoned that the relevant statutory provisions, 11 U.S.C. 
S 503(b)(3) and (4), were ambiguous with respect to whether 
an individual committee member may obtain 
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reimbursement for professional fees and that the legislative 
history and the policies of the Bankruptcy Code suggest 
that Congress intended to prohibit recovery of such fees as 
administrative expenses. See In Re First Merchants 
Acceptance Corp., No. 97-1500, slip op. at 5-8 (Bankr. D. 
Del. June 26, 1998) (herein slip op.). Bradford timely 
appealed this decision. 
 
II. 
 
Bradford's position is based squarely on the language of 
the statute. It contends that S 503(b) of the Code, as 
amended in 1994, expressly permits a member of a 
creditors committee to recover reasonable compensation for 
professional services incurred in its capacity as a member 
of that committee. It argues that because the meaning of 
the statute is clear on its face, our inquiry should be 
limited to the text of the provision, without recourse to 
other evidence of congressional intent. 
 
The Debtor, following the District Court's reasoning, 
urges that the 1994 amendment to S 503(b) created an 
ambiguity in the statute because S 503(b)(4) authorizes fees 
for reimbursable professional services rendered by the 
attorney of an "entity," but a "member of a committee" is 
not included within the definition of an "entity" in S 101(15) 
of the Code. The Debtor then argues that as a result of this 
ambiguity we can resort to the statute's purpose and its 
legislative history to ascertain whether a member of a 
committee is included within an "entity." The Trustee, who 
also urges affirmance, places his principal emphasis on the 
argument that Bradford's reading of the statute is 
demonstrably at odds with the purpose of the Bankruptcy 
Code as a whole and the legislative history of S 503(b)(3)(F). 
He argues that the better reading of S 503(b) would not 
allow recovery of attorney's fees by a member of a 
committee. 
 
A. 
 
THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE 
 
We turn first to the text of S 503(b)(3)(F) and S 503(b)(4) 
because their interaction is central to this appeal. Section 
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503(b)(3) lists those entities who are entitled to recover as 
administrative expenses their "actual, necessary expenses" 
(other than the professional fees specified in subsection 
(b)(4)). That section reads: 
 
       (b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be all owed, 
       administrative expenses . . . of this title, including -- 
 
       . . . 
 
       (3) the actual, necessary expenses, other than 
       compensation and reimbursement specified in 
       paragraph (4) of this subsection, incurred by-- 
 
        (A) a creditor that files a petition under s ection 
       303 of this title; 
 
        (B) a creditor that recovers, after the court' s 
       approval, for the benefit of the estate any property 
       transferred or concealed by the debtor; 
 
        (C) a creditor in connection with the prosecut ion of 
       a criminal offense relating to the case or to the 
       business or property of the debtor; 
 
        (D) a creditor, an indenture trustee, an equit y 
       security holder, or a committee representing 
       creditors or equity security holders other than a 
       committee appointed under section 1102 of this 
       title, in making a substantial contribution in a 
       case under chapter 9 or 11 of this title; 
 
        (E) a custodian superseded under section 543 o f 
       this title, and compensation for the services of 
       such custodian; or 
 
        (F) a member of a committee appointed under 
       section 1102 of this title, if such expenses are 
       incurred in the performance of the duties of such 
       committee[.] 
 
11 U.S.C. S 503. It was Subsection (F), the last of the six 
subsections, that was added to S 503 by the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, S 110, 108 Stat. 
4106, 4113. It is that section that authorizes members of 
creditors committees (who are among those who are 
"appointed under section 1102") to recover their "actual" 
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and "necessary expenses." No party to this appeal questions 
that. 
 
The case has arisen because the addition of S 503(b)(3)(F) 
affects those who are authorized under S 503(b)(4) to seek 
reasonable compensation for professional services, such as, 
inter alia, an attorney. Section 503(b)(4) allows as 
"administrative expenses" 
 
       (4) reasonable compensation for professional services 
       rendered by an attorney or an accountant of an entity 
       whose expense is allowable under paragraph (3) of this 
       subsection, based on the time, the nature, the extent, 
       and the value of such services, and the cost of 
       comparable services other than in a case under this 
       title, and reimbursement for actual, necessary 
       expenses incurred by such attorney or accountant[.] 
 
11 U.S.C. S 503(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
 
Section 503(b)(4) was not amended in 1994. However, 
because the two subsections, (b)(3) and (b)(4), are 
interdependent, and the allowance for reimbursement of 
professional fees in (b)(4) is tied to the list of"entities" in 
(b)(3), Bradford sees the language as unambiguous. Section 
503(b)(4) authorizes claims for attorney's and accountant's 
fees incurred by all entities who are allowed to claim 
administrative expenses under S 503(b)(3). Members of a 
creditors committee are plainly entitled to recover 
administrative expenses under S 503(b)(3)(F). A 
straightforward reading of the statute, therefore, authorizes 
reasonable allowances for attorney's fees or other 
professional fees incurred by a member of a committee, "if 
such expenses are incurred in the performance of the 
duties of such committee." 11 U.S.C. S 503(b)(3)(F). It seems 
inescapable from the statutory language that when 
Congress enacted the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act and 
added members of creditors committees to the list in 
S 503(b)(3) of those who can claim "actual" and "necessary 
expenses," it simultaneously expanded the list of entities 
who are entitled to reimbursement for professional fees 
under S 503(b)(4). 
 
Notwithstanding what appears to be the unambiguous 
language of S 503(b) to the effect that a committee member 
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may recover attorney's fees, the Bankruptcy Court found an 
ambiguity in the term "entity" as used inS 503(b)(4) insofar 
as it applies to a member of a creditors committee. Slip op. 
at 4-5. The Bankruptcy Court followed the earlier holding of 
a California bankruptcy court, see In Re County of Orange, 
179 B.R. 195 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995), when it denied 
Bradford's application for attorney's fees. In doing so, it 
stated that "[s]ection 101(15) does not specifically include `a 
member of a committee' as that phrase is specifically 
utilized in Section 503(b)(3)(F), and the Court will not graft 
that language into the provision in the context of a Section 
503(b)(4) application." Slip op. at 5. 
 
We do not find that reasoning persuasive. The term 
"entity" is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as a person, 
estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee. 
11 U.S.C. S 101(15). A "person" is defined broadly to 
include individuals, partnerships, and corporations. 11 
U.S.C. S 101(41). Bradford, as a corporation, falls within the 
broad definition of "entity." In addition, Bradford falls 
within the definition of a creditor, defined by the Code as 
an "entity that has a claim against the debtor. . . ." 11 
U.S.C. S 101(10) (emphasis added). 
 
The Debtor seeks to avoid the inevitable logic of these 
definitions by arguing that Bradford does not request 
reimbursement as a "corporation" or as a "creditor" but as 
a "member of a committee," which is not specifically defined 
as an entity in S 101(15). This is the same point made by 
the Bankruptcy Court. However, S 503 itself plainly 
provides that a member of a committee is an entity entitled 
to reimbursement for administrative expenses. Section 
503(a) begins with the broad authorization that"[a]n entity 
may timely file a request for payment of an administrative 
expense," 11 U.S.C.S 503(a) (emphasis added), and the next 
subsection proceeds to list all entities entitled to 
reimbursement, see 11 U.S.C. S 503(b)(3), which specifically 
includes committee members, see 11 U.S.C.S 503(b)(3)(F). 
 
Although finding an ambiguity in the language would 
have the advantage of permitting the court to resort to the 
legislative history, we cannot turn the language upside 
down and inside out to do so. To say that a member of a 
creditors committee -- who is, ipso facto, a creditor -- is 
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not an entity under the Code flatly contradicts both the 
ordinary understanding of the term "entity" and its usage in 
the Code. We therefore disagree with the Bankruptcy 
Court's conclusion that the term "entity" or its use in 
S 503(b)(4) is ambiguous. 
 
The Trustee takes a slightly less jarring position. The 
Trustee focuses on the phrase "if such expenses are 
incurred in the performance of the duties of such 
committee," and contends that the language of 
S 503(b)(3)(F) supports an alternative interpretation. The 
Trustee argues that this language limits reimbursement to 
committee members for expenses incurred in performance 
of "duties `of ' the committee," and does not permit 
reimbursement for duties that merely "pertain" or "relate" 
to the committee. Trustee's Br. at 19. Therefore, the Trustee 
continues, the duties of the committee must "involve formal 
committee work . . . , not a member's informal or personal 
response to its formal committee appointment." Id. 
 
According to the Trustee's interpretation, a member's 
voluntary consultation with private counsel is not incurred 
in the performance of the duties of the committee even if it 
pertains to the work of the committee and inures to its 
benefit. Presumably, it follows that if a member's personal 
lawyer successfully negotiated a substantial reduction of a 
creditor's large claim, that service would not qualify as 
incurred in the performance of the duties of the committee 
because that lawyer had not been authorized to represent 
the committee. However, as interpreted by the Trustee, if 
the identical service was performed by one of the 
committee's lawyers it would be considered as incurred in 
the performance of the duties of such committee. 
 
Although there may be reasons why the work done by the 
attorney for the creditor should not be reimbursed, we do 
not think they can be found in the phrase "duties of the 
committee." The nature of the services does not depend on 
the identity of the actor; either the service is or is not 
incurred in the performance of the duties of such 
committee. For example, a phone call to a creditor to 
negotiate a reduction in the Debtor's liability is an expense 
incurred in the performance of the duties of such 
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committee, whether the call was made by a committee 
member, an aide to that member, or the member's attorney. 
 
We fail to find an ambiguity in S 503(b)(3)(F) or S 503(b)(4) 
that would overcome the straightforward reading of the 
provision as permitting committee members to recover 
attorney's fees for work performed in connection with that 
entity's service on the committee. There is no principled 
way to read the language of S 503(b)(4) that allows recovery 
of attorney's and accountant's fees "of an entity whose 
expense is allowable under paragraph (3)" to include as 
"entities" those in subsections (A)-(E) of paragraph (3) but 
not those in subsection (F). 
 
Our conclusion that the language of S 503 is not 
ambiguous does not mean that creditors committee 
members may necessarily receive compensation for their 
lawyer's fees incurred in relation to their duties as 
committee members. However, we would have to find 
reason to exclude such compensation elsewhere. 
 
B. 
 
APPELLEES' ARGUMENTS 
 
1. Tension with S 1103(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
Both the Debtor and Trustee find reason to preclude 
recovery for the entire category of attorney's fees for 
committee members in the sharp conflict such an 
interpretation would create with S 1103(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Section 1103(a) sets forth the process by 
which the committee as a whole may employ professionals. 
It provides that the committee, at a scheduled meeting in 
which a majority of the members are present and with the 
court's approval, may "select and authorize the employment 
. . . of one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents, 
to represent or perform services for [the] committee." 11 
U.S.C. S 1103(a). 
 
We have previously emphasized the importance of the 
requirement of prior court approval for the hiring of 
committee counsel. In Matter of Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 
F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir. 1986), we held that a court may 
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authorize employment of counsel nunc pro tunc only under 
extraordinary circumstances, explaining that the 
requirement of prior court approval "was designed to 
eliminate the abuses and detrimental practices that had 
been found to prevail," such as "cronyism" and "attorney 
control of bankruptcy cases." We stressed that the prior 
approval requirement ensures "that the court may know the 
type of individual who is engaged in the proceeding, their 
integrity, their experience in connection with work of this 
type, as well as their competency concerning the same." Id. 
at 648 (quoting In re Hydrocarbon Chemicals, Inc., 411 F.2d 
203 (3d Cir. 1969) (en banc)). 
 
Bradford's plain language interpretation of the statute 
would allow committee members to retain counsel privately, 
without prior review by the court and without notice to the 
committee or other creditors. The only review would come 
after the fact, when the court is called upon to determine: 
(1) whether the fees are "reasonable . . . based on the time, 
the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, and 
the cost of comparable services other than in a case under 
this title," S 503(b)(4); and (2) if such fees were "incurred in 
the performance of the duties of such committee," 
S 503(b)(3)(F). Consequently, the potential for the abuses 
that S 1103 was designed to eliminate is a real concern. In 
addition, if every member of a committee were to claim 
attorney's and accountant's fees, there would be a 
proliferation of administrative expenses which could 
unnecessarily drain estate assets. 
 
Accordingly, we cannot lightly dismiss the argument that 
the plain language reading of S 503(b)(4) leads inescapably 
to tension with the statutory scheme for retention of 
professionals by the committee established by S 1103. 
 
2. Legislative History 
 
The Debtor and the Trustee also urge that we examine 
the legislative history of the 1994 Amendment toS 503 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, which they contend supports their 
interpretation that S 503(b)(4) does not authorize committee 
members to recover attorney's fees as administrative 
expenses. Assuming arguendo that we are free to resort to 
that legislative history in the absence of an ambiguity in the 
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statutory language, we conclude that the legislative history 
does not resolve the issue before us. 
 
In 1993, the Senate passed S.B. 540 which contained a 
number of substantial changes in the Bankruptcy Code. 
Included in the bill was a proposal to add S 503(b)(7) as a 
new provision that would have allowed reimbursement of: 
 
       the actual, necessary expenses incurred by a member 
       of a committee appointed under section 1102 in the 
       performance of duties of the committee (including fees 
       of an attorney or accountant for professional services 
       rendered for the member to the extent allowable under 
       paragraph (4)) other than claims for compensation for 
       services rendered as a member of the committee. 
 
S. Rep. No. 103-168, at 6 (1993) (emphasis added). When 
the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code finally passed 
Congress in 1994,2 it was the House Bill that was passed in 
lieu of the Senate Bill, and the House Bill did not contain 
the language emphasized above in proposed S 503(b)(7). 
There was no explanation from the Senate when it 
concurred in the House version. 
 
The House Report on the 1994 Amendments suggests 
that the addition of subsection (F), adding members of 
creditor and equity holder committees to the list of entities 
entitled to recover "actual and necessary expenses," was 
intended only to allow those members reimbursement for 
their incidental out-of-pocket expenses and was not 
intended to include compensation for professional services. 
The House Report states: 
 
       The current Bankruptcy Code is silent regarding 
       whether members of official committees appointed in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was the culmination of several 
years of hearings and testimony on bankruptcy reform before 
Congressional committees. The amendment at issue,S 110 of H.R. 5116, 
was one of fifty-three sections intended to effectuate some degree of 
reform. Other changes of varying significance included provisions to 
expedite the filing of plans under chapter 11, a limitation on the ability 
of small investment companies to file for bankruptcy protection, and 
amendments to provide greater protection for alimony and child support 
owed by a debtor in bankruptcy. 
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       chapter 11 cases are entitled to reimbursement of their 
       out-of-pocket expenses (such as travel and lodging), 
       and the courts have split on the question of allowing 
       reimbursement. 
 
       This section of the bill amends section 503(b) of the 
       Bankruptcy Code to specifically permit members of 
       chapter 11 committees to receive court-approved 
       reimbursement of their actual and necessary out-of- 
       pocket expenses. The new provision would not allow the 
       payment of compensation for services rendered by or to 
       committee members. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 39 (1994), reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348 (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). It is the underlined language that the Debtor and 
Trustee emphasize. 
 
As this case demonstrates, attempting to divine legislative 
intent on the basis of "Congress's unexplained modification 
of language in earlier drafts of legislation" can be 
problematic. Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 135 F.3d 
791, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1998). It may be, as the Debtor argues, 
that the adoption by Congress of the House version was a 
deliberate policy decision to reject the language in the 
earlier Senate version that expressly provided for the 
recovery of professional fees for committee members. Cf. 
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 248 
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
("One must assume that a deliberate policy decision 
informed Congress' rejection of [earlier considered] 
alternatives in favor of the language presently contained in 
[the statute in question]."). However, it is difficult to draw 
that conclusion in light of our reading of the plain language 
of the Act, which adopted the House version, to authorize 
reimbursement for professional fees. We have no conclusive 
evidence that the Senate adopted the statement in the 
House Report that the revised Act bars reimbursement of 
lawyer fees, as neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the 
parties have any basis to assume the Senate was aware of 
the one sentence in the House Report upon which the 
parties rely. 
 
The Debtor urges us to bear in mind that every year 
following the adoption of the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act, 
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there has been an effort in Congress to amend S 503(b)(3)(F) 
to clarify that "[e]xpenses for attorneys or accountants 
incurred by individual members of creditors `and equity 
security holders' committees would not be recoverable, but 
expenses incurred for such professional services by the 
committees themselves would be." S. Rep. No. 105-253 at 
52 (1998); see also Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 
1996, S. 1559, 104th Cong. S 7 (1996), reprinted in 142 
Cong. Rec. 21787 (1996); Bankruptcy Amendments of 1997 
Act, H.R. 764, 105th Cong. S 13 (1997), reprinted in H.R. 
Rep. No. 105-324 (1997); Consumer Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1998, S. 1301, 105th Cong. S 411, reprinted in S. 
Rep. No. 105-253 (1998); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, 
H.R. 833, 106th Cong. S 1110 (1999); Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. S 1109 (1999) (currently 
pending before the Senate). 
 
But, as the Trustee conceded at oral argument, 
subsequent legislative history, particularly when the 
proposals do not become law, "is a `hazardous basis for 
inferring the intent of an earlier' Congress." Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) 
(citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)); see 
also United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 
U.S. 258, 282 (1947) ("We fail to see how the remarks of 
these Senators in 1943 can serve to change the legislative 
intent of the Congress expressed in 1932 . . . ."). These 
subsequent failed attempts by Congress lack "persuasive 
significance" because we can draw numerous equally 
reasonable inferences therefrom. See LTV, 496 U.S. at 650. 
While the immediate and continuous attempts in Congress 
to specify that there may be no reimbursement of attorney's 
fees for committee members may show that the 1994 
Congress failed to realize the effect of its addition of 
S 503(b)(3)(F), it is equally plausible that the unsuccessful 
attempts in subsequent Congresses reflect satisfaction with 
the plain language of the provision. Accordingly, we can 
give no conclusive weight to the subsequent legislative 
history as evidence of the intent of Congress in 1994. 
 
III. 
 
As the foregoing makes clear, the plain language of the 
statute arguably is in conflict with the intent of Congress as 
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reflected in the House Report but definitely conflicts with 
the requirement of S 1103 that the bankruptcy courts must 
approve the selection of lawyers to represent the committee. 
This, the appellees contend, is adequate reason for us to 
disregard the plain language and instead effectuate 
Congress's intent. 
 
However, Supreme Court cases declaring that clear 
language cannot be overcome by contrary legislative history 
are legion. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 
8 (1997) ("We . . . follow the text, rather than the legislative 
history [of the statute]."); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 
162 (1991) ("[T]his Court has repeated with some 
frequency: `Where, as here, the resolution of a question of 
federal law turns on a statute and the intention of 
Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then 
to the legislative history if the statutory language is 
unclear.' ") (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 
(1984)); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 n.3 (1984) 
("Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face 
of the [statute] is inescapably ambiguous. . ..") (quoting 
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 
384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)); United States v. 
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) 
("[W]here, as here, the statute's language is plain, `the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its 
terms'.") (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 
485 (1917)). 
 
Admittedly, the Court has made an exception for "rare 
cases" in which "the literal application of a statute will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions 
of its drafters." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 
564, 571 (1982). In such situations, "those intentions must 
be controlling." Id.; see also Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989) ("Looking beyond the 
naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result 
it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems 
inconsistent with Congress' intention, since the plain- 
meaning rule is `rather an axiom of experience than a rule 
of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive 
evidence if it exists.' ") (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)). Moreover, we are 
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enjoined to interpret statutes in light of the context of the 
statutory scheme. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 
U.S. 1, 10 (1962) ("[A] section of a statute should not be 
read in isolation from the context of the whole Act."). 
Statutory interpretations "which would produce absurd 
results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations 
consistent with the legislative purpose are available." 
Griffin, 458 U.S. at 575 (1982). 
 
But only absurd results and "the most extraordinary 
showing of contrary intentions" justify a limitation on the 
"plain meaning" of the statutory language. Garcia, 469 U.S. 
at 75. As we discussed earlier, the legislative history is far 
from clear. 
 
In addition, although the Debtor and Trustee adduce 
many reasons why it might be incongruous or unwise to 
allow claims for reimbursement for services of professionals 
retained by members of a committee, there has been no 
showing that the result apparently commanded by the plain 
language of the statute is truly "absurd." In Chapter 11 
proceedings, a creditors committee has an active role in the 
reorganization, as it helps develop a plan of reorganization 
and ultimately decides whether to accept or reject a 
Chapter 11 plan. The creditors committee also monitors the 
conduct of the debtor to ensure its compliance with the 
Bankruptcy Code and advises the creditors of their rights. 
See 11 U.S.C. S 1103(c); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. 
Pincus, Verlin, Hahn, Reich & Goldstein Prof. Corp., 42 B.R. 
960, 963 (Bankr. D.C. 1984). Responsible fulfillment of 
these duties may entail a substantial amount of work by 
committee members which is of value to the committee as 
a whole and may require services by a creditor's counsel. 
 
Further, it is not at all clear that the allowance of 
professional fees to committee members is necessarily an 
invitation to chaos in the functioning of committees or will 
cause the wholesale depletion of bankruptcy estates. The 
bankruptcy court retains the power to ensure that only 
those fees that are demonstrably incurred in the 
performance of the duties of the committee, the statutory 
standard, are reimbursed. Moreover, in its review of each 
application to determine whether the fee requested is 
reasonable, as required by the statute, the bankruptcy 
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court must necessarily determine whether the services were 
necessary. This review is committed to the sound discretion 
of the bankruptcy courts. See Matter of DP Partners Ltd. 
Partnership, 106 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, many 
of the concerns expressed by the Trustee can be 
accommodated within the plain language interpretation of 
the statute, and the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court on 
remand will set the tone for future applications, even if 
Congress fails to amend the statute once more to make 
clear its intent, the result we believe would be preferable.3 
 
Although we acknowledge that the plain language of 
S 503(b)(4) presents serious tension with the scheme for 
retention of professionals by the committee as a whole 
created by S 1103, it is insufficient reason to justify failure 
to follow the unambiguous directive contained in the 
language of S 503. Accordingly, we leave any redrafting of 
the statute in Congress' hands. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Bankruptcy 
Court's decision and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As of this writing, Congress has not yet passed a pending bill that 
would resolve the issue before us. 
 
                                16 
 
